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PRIOR RESTRAINT OF STUDENT NEWSPAPER QUESTIONNAIRE PERMITTED
TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM
Trachtman v. Anker
The broad authority of public school officials to supervise and
control the conduct of students during the course of their formal
education has been long recognized by the courts.' Until recently,
many courts have been willing to defer to action by school officials
which could be said to have a "reasonable educational basis."2 A
dramatic departure from such judicial self-restraint, however, was
signaled by Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,3 in
which the Supreme Court for the first time explicitly recognized the
right of students to freedom of expression.' Tinker held that teach-
, See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
2 The deference with which courts traditionally reviewed the judgment of school officials
can be traced largely to the doctrine of in loco parentis. Under this doctrine the school was
viewed as a means to inculcate in children the social mores and values of society. School
officials were given great latitude in effectuating this goal. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ.
v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924) (school authorities stand in loco parentis
and may take any action relating to the mental training, moral and physical discipline, and
welfare of the pupils that a parent could take); 55 TEX. L. REv. 511, 513 (1977). As long as
there was some reasonable educational basis for the school's actions, courts deferred to the
school officials' judgment. E. REMrrr & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIc EDUCATION 108
(1973). School authorities also have a valid interest in the physical and social development
of students. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 389
(1969). Accordingly, in State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, appeal
dismissed, 278 U.S. 661 (1928), the dismissal of a college student because her husband had
served liquor to other students was upheld. In Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Bd,, 57 F.
Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944), school authorities were allowed to prevent students from joining
fraternities and sororities. Additionally, exclusion of married persons from extracurricular
activities was held to be reasonable in Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d
854 (1967).
3 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker the petitioners were high school students who were
suspended from school for wearing black armbands in school as a symbol of their opposition
to the Vietnam War. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court's dismissal of the suit
brought by the students against the board of education, held that such expression was akin
to pure speech and thus protected by the first amendment. For the first time, the Court
specifically held that students possessed first amendment rights which could only be abridged
when there were facts which could "reasonably have led school authorites to forecast substan-
tial disruption of or a material interference with school activities," or which intruded upon
the rights of other students. Id. at 514.
1 Prior to Tinker most cases implicating the individual rights of students, except for cases
alleging violations of the equal protection or free exercise clauses, involved college students.
See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961) (due process requires notice and hearing before school authorities can expel
students for misconduct at tax-supported college); Hammond v. South Carolina State Col-
lege, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (rule requiring prior approval of college authorities for
all public demonstrations violated students' first amendment rights). See generally Gyory,
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ers and students have first amendment rights, even within the
unique confines of the school environment, which cannot be re-
stricted absent a showing by school authorities that the exercise of
those rights would "materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school" or conflict with the rights of others.' Recently, however, the
Second Circuit, in Trachtman v. Ankerl held that the refusal of
school authorities to permit the distribution of a sex questionnaire
by students was not an unconstitutional abridgement of the stu-
dents' first amendment rights.7 The court upheld the acknowledged
prior restraint on the ground that the school authorities had shown
a "substantial basis" for believing that the questionnaire might
have an adverse psychological effect on other students."
Jeff Trachtman, editor-in-chief of the Voice, the student news-
paper of Stuyvesant High School in Manhattan, had drafted a ques-
tionnaire in preparation for an article in the Voice concerning the
sexual attitudes of Stuyvesant students The questionnaire was to
be distributed randomly to ninth through twelfth grade students in
the school and was to be accompanied by a cover letter assuring
participants of their anonymity and cautioning them that it was
unnecessary to answer any questions which made them feel uncom-
fortable. 10 Jeff Trachtman and another student unsuccessfully
sought permission from the school principal to conduct the survey.
The Chancellor of the New York City schools and the board of
education refused to reverse this decision" in view of the psycholgi-
The Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 201 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Gyory].
393 U.S. at 509, 513 (1969).
563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1491 (1978), rev'g in part & aff'g in
part 426 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
563 F.2d at 519-20.
Id. One commentator has suggested that the uniqueness of the school setting may
require the psychological, as well as the physical, protection of students. For example, racial
epithets and verbal abuse which might be psychologically harmful to a child could justifiably
be prohibited by school officials. See Gyory, supra note 4, at 219. Trachtman, however,
appears to be the first case which has found psychological disturbance of students to be the
kind of injury or harm which would justify restrictions on freedom of speech under the Tinker
guidelines.
1 563 F.2d at 514. The questionnaire contained 25 questions on topics ranging from the
student's feelings about traditional dating patterns and the institution of marriage, to ques-
tions inquiring into the student's views toward abortion, homosexuality, and contraception.
The student was also questioned about the extent of his own sexual experience. 426 F. Supp.
at 205-07.
o 426 F. Supp. at 205.
563 F.2d at 514-15. The issue of unlawful prior restraint was never raised by the
plaintiffs when challenging the school's action within the educational system. Although the
[Vol. 52:265
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cal harm many students might suffer if subjected to the question-
naire. 2 Trachtman and his father then commenced an action in
federal district court under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871. 3 They sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground
that the actions of the school officials violated the students' first
amendment rights." The district court held that the defendants had
failed to show that significant harm would result to the eleventh and
twelfth graders and thus enjoined the school authorities from pro-
hibiting distribution of the questionnaire to these students. The
prohibition on distribution was allowed to stand, however, with re-
spect to the ninth and tenth graders. 5
Second Circuit held that prior restraint of student expression is not unconstitutional per se,
it has placed strict procedural due process safeguards on any system of prior approval which
public schools establish. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
Included among these safeguards is an expeditious review procedure. Id. at 810. In
Trachtman, the students' first appeal of the principal's decision not to allow the question-
naire to be distributed was made on December 4, 1975 and a response was not received until
December 17. Their next appeal, to Chancellor Anker, made on December 24, was never
answered. On January 13, 1976 they appealed to the board of education, and they received a
reply on February 27, 1976. Thus, almost 3 months elapsed between the time plaintiffs first
sought prior approval and when they received a final review of the initial decision. Although
such a delay would appear to violate the procedural due process requirements of Eisner,
plaintiffs chose not to challenge it, evidently preferring to focus on the substantive issue
whether the Board was justified in prohibiting the distribution of the questionnaire.
In addition to an expeditious review procedure specifying the time period in which school
officials must decide whether to permit distribution, Eisner also requires that a school regula-
tion specify to whom, and how, material is to be submitted for clearance. 440 F.2d at 811.
Moreover, a prior approval system must prescribe some criteria by which school officials may
determine if distribution of the printed material should be prohibited. Id. at 809. In the
Trachtman case, Stuyvesant High School had no formal system for determining what materi-
als could be prohibited or any system of reviewing the decision of the principal. The plaintiff
established his own review procedure by submitting his request for permission to distribute
the questionnaire upward through the hierarchy of the New York City school system. Tele-
phone conversation with Mr. Martin Berger, counsel for plaintiffs, Oct. 15, 1977.
12 426 F. Supp. at 200. The school authorities also argued that research on a sensitive
topic such as sexuality could only be conducted by qualified experts in compliance with the
standards contained in a school board handbook for research applicants. Id. This handbook
was interpreted by the district court to apply only to teachers, college students, and certain
agencies. Id. at 203. The school authorities did not raise this issue on appeal. 563 F.2d at 518,
n.7.
13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
" 563 F.2d at 515. Jeff Trachtman sued not only as an individual student, but also in a
representative capacity on behalf of the student newspaper and its staff. Id. at 514 n.1. As a
result, the case was not declared moot after Trachtman's graduation in June 1977.
11 Id. at 515.
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On appeal, a divided Second Circuit panel reversed that part
of the district court's holding that enjoined the school authorities
from prohibiting distribution to the eleventh and twelfth graders.,,
Judge Lumbard, writing for the majority, 7 initially recognized that
the plaintiffs first amendment rights had been adversely affected
by the school's actions and that the decision in Tinker was control-
ling on the question whether the defendants had met their burden
of proof in justifying the prior restraint.'8 The majority accepted
without discussion the premise that school authorities have a legiti-
mate interest in protecting the "psychological well being of stu-
dents" and sought to determine whether the school had a substan-
tial basis for believing that the distribution would cause significant
psychological harm to some Stuyvesant students.'9 In disposing of
this issue, the majority relied heavily on the defendants' expert
witnesses' affidavits, which supported the contention that some stu-
dents might be rendered anxious and tense to the point of "serious
emotional difficulties" if confronted with the questionnaire. 21 On
the basis of these affidavits, the majority concluded that the school
t1 Id. at 520.
'7 Judge Gurfein concurred in Judge Lumbard's opinion while Judge Mansfield dis-
sented.
11 563 F.2d at 516. The Tinker Court held that high school students were entitled to the
protection of the first amendment. In order to justify a prohibition on the exercise of student
first amendment rights, school officials had to show that they had reason to anticipate
material and substantial interference with school activities or with the rights of others. 393
U.S. at 509. While not stipulating the precise extent of this burden of proof, the Court did
say that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression." Id. at 508. See note 3 supra.
563 F.2d at 517.
Id. at 517-18. The Second Circuit is apparently the first court to hold that the possibil-
ity of psychological disturbance is a sufficient justification for restricting free speech rights.
Aside from the fact that is is questionable whether the Supreme Court intended this type of
injury to be included within the parameters of the guidelines laid down in Tinker, the recogni-
tion of psychological harm as a substantive evil justifying prior restraint poses significant
practical difficulties. As Judge Mansfield pointed out in his dissent, psychological harm is a
very vague and nebulous concept which gives school authorities extremely broad latitude in
determining what speech to censor. Id. at 521 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). It is difficult to
imagine controversial or unpopular opinions which would not disturb at least some people
psychologically. Yet, it is exactly this type of speech which the first amendment apparently
was meant to protect.
There is, moreover, the problem of measuring the degree of psychological impact in order
to determine whether it is of a material and substantial nature. Such a determination would
be difficult enough if the psychic injury had already occurred, but to attempt to measure the
potential trauma which certain expressions might have on a class of people with widely
differing psychic makeups would be difficult. This would either entangle courts in a fruitless
weighing of the conflicting opinions of psychologists, or force them to defer, as the Tracht-
man court did, to the judgment of school authorities, as long as it can be supported by at
least some expert opinion.
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officials had carried their burden of justifying the prior restraint on
distribution.2 1
Judge Mansfield, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that psychological injury to students was the type of
substantial evil which would justify a prohibition of speech. Noting
that this kind of injury is far too "vague and nebulous" to support
an extension of the rights-of-others concept alluded to in Tinker,2 2
Judge Mansfield maintained that only activities leading to a disrup-
tion of school functions or a breach of the peace would justify a prior
restraint of the plaintiff's first amendment rights.2 3 Assuming for
the sake of argument that the rights of others included the students'
right to be free of emotional distress, Judge Mansfield nevertheless
concluded that the school authorities had failed to sustain their
burden of showing that the risk of such injury was substantial
enough to outweigh the plaintiff's free speech interests. 2 The specu-
lative and conclusory opinions of a few psychologists were not, in
Judge Mansfield's view, sufficient to sustain this burden, particu-
larly in view of the conflicting expert opinions offered by the plain-
tiff.2
It is submitted that the Trachtman holding misinterprets the
rights-of-others concept alluded to in Tinker 2 and indicates a fur-
2 Id. at 520. Both parties in Trachtman submitted affidavits from psychological experts
in support of their respective positions. All of the affidavits were based on hypothetical
opinions rather than any specific factual information about the students themselves. Id. at
522 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The conclusion of the defendants' four experts was that
confrontation with the explicitly sexual questions in the questionnaire might cause anxiety
and tension in some students. One of the experts believed it was possible that some stu-
dents might be induced into a state of panic or even psychosis. Id. at 517. The conclusions
of plaintiffs' five experts, on the other hand, included one opinion that there was no basis for
expecting resultant emotional harm to students. Another psychologist stated that while there
was a possibility of anxiety among some students, such possibility was minimal compared to
the overall benefits to be derived from allowing students to share information with respect to
a subject of great concern to them. The credentials of plaintiffs' experts were found by Judge
Mansfield to be more impressive than those of defendants' experts. Id. at 522 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting). Judge Gurfein, in a concurring opinion, also acknowledged that plaintiffs' experts
exhibited credentials which might be considered "more impressive." Id. at 520 (Gurfein, J.,
concurring).
12 Id. at 520-21 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 520-21. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 520 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
Id. at 522 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
21 393 U.S. at 508-09. It would appear that the Tinker Court was concerned with the
physical intrusion into the rights of others, since it cited Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd.
of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), in support of its statement concerning interference
with the rights of others. 393 U.S. at 513. In Blackwell, the court of appeals upheld the
suspension of students for wearing freedom buttons where their conduct had been boisterous
and disorderly and they had harassed students who did not wear the buttons. 363 F.2d at
754.
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ther narrowing by the Second Circuit of student first amendment
rights.27 In upholding the prior restraint on the distribution of the
sex questionnaire, the Trachtman court accepted the argument
made by school authorities that there existed a potential for signifi-
cant psychological harm to some students." This ratification of the
school board's fear of potential harm as a basis for prior restraint
seems contrary to the Tinker holding and its application by other
courts.
21
It is clear that the first amendment is a preferred right which
students possess to the greatest extent practicable within the school
environment. In Tinker the Supreme Court held that students may
1 See Presidents Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 998 (1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); notes 43-
53 and accompanying text infra.
21 563 F.2d at 517.
Tinker is usually interpreted to require school authorities to demonstrate that the
abridgement of student first amendment activity is necessary to prevent a material and
substantial interference with the orderly operation of the school. See, e.g., Quarterman v.
Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir.
1971); Riseman v. School Comm. 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Scoville v. Board
of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc); Cintron v. State Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp.
674 (D. P.R. 1974). In Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972),
the court held that the suspension of five high school students for distributing an underground
newspaper containing controversial articles on marijuana laws and birth control was uncon-
stitutional. The Shanley court stated that the test for determining if the school was justified
in its actions is whether the expression materially and substantially interferes with the activi-
ties or discipline of the school. The court found that there was no evidence of any disturbance
or disruption. Id. at 969. In Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), two high
school students had been expelled for distributing, on school premises, material critical of
school policies and school authorities. The court of appeals reversed the district court's
dismissal of the students' suit, noting that there was no evidence that the school board could
have reasonably forecast that the distribution would substantially disrupt or materially inter-
fere with school procedures. Id. In a similar situation, wherein two high school students were
expelled for distributing a newspaper which criticized school officials, a district court held
that a student had a right to express himself in a nondisruptive manner, subject only to
reasonable limitations concerning time, place, manner, and duration. Sullivan v. Houston
Indep. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
In Trachtman there were indications that disapproval of the content of the questionnaire,
and the planned newspaper article interpreting its results, was foremost among the school
authorities' reasons for acting. The majority in Trachtman alluded to the fact that the school
officials felt the topic of sexuality required special treatment because of its sensitive nature
and therefore should only be taught by teachers with special qualifications. 563 F.2d at 518.
In other words, school officials did not find the topic of sexuality itself to be psychologically
harmful to students as long as it was presented in the light and manner the school officials
deemed proper. The Trachtman court appears to have accepted this position as legitimate,
stating that school officials could be justifiably concerned that the proposed newspaper article
might draw misleading conclusions about the sexuality of Stuyvesant students. Id. at 516 n.2.
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969);
accord, Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
422 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (prisoners retain first amendment rights unless the state
has a substantial government interest in restricting).
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exercise their first amendment freedoms absent a finding of conduct
which would "materially and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline" in the school, or conflict with
the rights of others.31 Since a restriction of these first amendment
rights is permissible only in "narrow and well-defined circumstan-
ces," the burden is on the school authorities to justify any such
restraint. Thus, it has been stated that "the burden of justification
for school censorship actions approaches, in practice if not in rheto-
ric, a 'clear and present danger to educational objectives' stan-
dard." -' Prior to Trachtman, a district court within the Second
Circuit implicity approved this standard when it rejected an at-
tempt by school officials to suppress distribution of a student news-
paper.3 1
The expansion of the Tinker standard by the Trachtman court
to encompass potential psychological harm contrasts with a recent
district court decision in Virginia. In Gambino v. Fairfax County
School Board, a school board prohibited students from publishing
a school newspaper article containing birth control information and
the results of a survey of student attitudes toward birth control. 6
Noting that the school paper was a conduit for student expression
on a wide variety of subjects and was therefore protected by the first
amendment, 3 the court rejected school board arguments that the
paper could be suppressed pursuant to the board's general authority
over school curriculum. 8 Of particular significance was the
Gambino court's rejection of the school board's attempts to justify
censorship of the newspaper on the ground that its dissemination
11 393 U.S. at 509(quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
3 393 U.S. at 508; cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (only
in narrow circumstances may the state bar dissemination of constitutionally protected mate-
rials to minors).
3 55 TEx. L. REv. 511, 522 (1977). One commentator has stated that the Tinker standard,
and subsequent cases applying it to student press and hairstyle controversies, signals "the
emergence of a 'first amendment theory of education .... "' Nahmod, Controversy in the
Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1032, 1061 (1971).
"In Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (mem.), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504
(2d Cir. 1975), seizure of a supplement to the high school newspaper containing information
on sex education was found to violate the first and fourteenth amendment rights of students.
383 F. Supp. at 1166. Since potential interference with schoolwork and discipline was
"extremely unlikely," the school board could not proscribe distribution consistent with the
protections of the first amendment. Id. at 1165.
429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977).
: Id. at 733.
Id. at 735.
'7 Id. at 736.
19781
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implicated the rights of students who might be offended by its con-
tents."9 The court reasoned that since students had to affirmatively
pick up their copies of the paper, there was no need to further
protect the rights of such students."
The Gambino decision appears more consistent with the spirit
of Tinker and its progeny and illustrates a more progressive view of
students' first amendment rights. Tinker's reference to the rights of
other students should be read in light of the facts of that case, where
the concern was with possible physical disturbance resulting from
the wearing of black armbands.1 To interpret Tinker as supporting
the prior restraint of a nonobscene student publication based upon
potential psychological harm seems questionable. The Tinker Court
stressed the educational significance of communication among stu-
dents and stated that such communication could be restricted only
if it invaded the rights of others.4 2 The Trachtman decision broadens
the permissible grounds upon which school officials can restrict stu-
dent first amendment activities to include potential psychological
harm to other students. Thus, this holding limits the extent to
which students may be exposed to controversial ideas and topics
that might not be discussed in the classroom.
Twice previously, the Second Circuit has upheld the authority
of school officials to preclude student access to controversial sub-
jects. In Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education,4 3 the authority of
school officials to exercise prior restraint over printed matter dis-
tributed on school grounds was upheld. The court stated that the
state has a legitimate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the
educational process.44 Prior restraint is constitutionally permissible,
according to the Eisner court, if distribution of the material would
disrupt the educational process and if the school officials observe
adequate procedural safeguards in reviewing the student publica-
tions.4" Eisner, which is recognized as the leading case supporting
' Id. The Gambino court likened the paper to the school library where material contain-
ing more extensive and explicit birth control information was present. Id.
" Id. The school board argued that the circumstances, in effect, compelled student
exposure to the paper's contents, and therefore was a proper situation for application of the
"captive audience" doctrine. Id. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
The court rejected this argument reasoning that the situation did not involve a lack of free
choice in the captive audience sense. Id. at 736. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
" See note 3 supra.
'2 393 U.S. at 512-13.
4' 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 807-08.
Id. at 810.
[Vol. 52:265
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the right of school authorities to regulate the content of student
publications,' 6 has been followed by most circuits.17 It represents,
however, a significant narrowing of the first amendment rights rec-
ognized in Tinker and consequently has been subjected to sharp
criticism."
The Second Circuit's restrictive view of student rights is also
evidenced by Presidents Council v. Community School Board,9
wherein the court held that the removal of a controversial book from
a school library did not impinge upon the constitutional rights of
students. 0 As in Trachtman, the Presidents Council court urged
Note, Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE L.J. 1325, 1330 (1973).
u Of those circuits which have considered the prior restraint issue, the majority view is
that prior restraint in high schools is permissible if there are adequate procedural safeguards.
See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975) (prior restraint is permissible if it contains
narrow, objective, and reasonable standards); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462
F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (prior approval of student distribution of materials not per se uncon-
stitutional, but regulation must not operate to stifle content or be unreasonable or too com-
plex); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971) (prior restraint system in
schools permissible if accompanied by specific procedural safeguards); cf. Riseman v. School
Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971) (school's denial of permission to distribute anti-war
leaflets under a regulation prohibiting the promotion of any nonschool organization without
prior approval held unconstitutional as being vague, overbroad, and not reflecting any effort
to minimize adverse effect of prior restraint). Only the Seventh Circuit has held that requiring
prior approval of publications in school is unconstitutional per se as a prior restraint. The
Seventh Circuit would allow school officials to regulate only the time, manner, and place of
distribution of written materials. See Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th
Cir. 1972). See generally E. REuTrr, THE COURTS AND STUDENT CONDUCT 27-35 (1975).
The acceptance of prior restraint within the school environment is not in accord with the
"heavy presumption" against the validity of prior restraint invoked by courts in nonschool
contexts. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("[a] system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity"). Courts view systems of prior restraint with disfavor and have subjected
them to a stricter standard of review than situations where sanctions are challenged subse-
quent to the expression at issue. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), was the first case
in which the Supreme Court specifically enunciated the prior restraint doctrine. The Court
articulated the general principle that one of the primary purposes of the first amendment is
to provide immunity from censorship. Only in very limited circumstances will exceptions be
made to this principle. The exceptions listed in dictum by the Near Court were, inter alia,
speech which would hinder the nation in wartime, or incite violence or forceful overthrow of
the government. Id. at 716. The most recent statement by the Supreme Court on the doctrine
is found in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the Pentagon Papers case,
in which the Court reiterated its dislike of prior restraint and stated that "the First Amend-
ment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or
conjecture that untoward consequences may result." Id. at 725-27. See Emerson, The Doc-
trine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROS. 648, 656-58 (1955). For a discussion of how
the doctrine of prior restraint applies in a school context, see 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 611 (1973).
4 See, e.g., Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (7th Cir. 1972); Note,
Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE L.J. 1325, 1336 (1973).
1, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
10 457 F.2d at 291. The book in question, Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas, is
an autobiographical account of growing up in Spanish Harlem. Id.
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judicial restraint in educational disputes." Since some parents had
claimed that possible adverse moral and psychological effects would
result if students read the book, the court concluded that the school
board had sufficient grounds upon which to remove it from the
library.5" This questionable analysis of the breadth of student first
amendment protection has been subjected to opprobrium stemming
from the judiciary and commentators alike.53
By emphasizing the rights-of-others concept and accepting the
affidavits of experts retained by school officials as a sufficient basis
for determining that significant psychological harm to other stu-
dents is likely, the Trachtman court has expanded the power of
school officials to exercise prior restraints in the educational setting.
Thus, in the future, claims by officials that significant psychological
harm is likely to result from distribution of student publications will
apparently satisfy the burden imposed on school authorities to jus-
tify limitations on the exercise of first amendment rights. Such a
result does not bode well for the right of students to distribute
student written material on school grounds and is a regrettable
extension of the holdings of Eisner and Presidents Council. As sug-
gested in Judge Mansfield's dissent in Trachtman, a rule permitting
prior restraint in the interest of protecting students' psychological
well-being is one that readily lends itself to abuse by school authori-
ties." It is hoped that, in the future, the Second Circuit will heed
Judge Mansfield's warning and carefully scrutinize efforts of school
authorities to censor student publications.
Suzanne B. Albani
5' Id.
S Id. at 293.
See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); 55
TEX. L. REV. 511 (1977); 30 VAND. L. REv. 85 (1977).
563 F.2d at 521 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield stated that "[tihe possi-
bilities for harmful censorship under the guise of 'protecting' the rights of students against
emotional strain are sufficiently numerous to be frightening." Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
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